The ancient sorites paradox is traditionally attributed to Eubulides, a contemporary of Aristotle and a member of the Megarian school, who is also credited with inventing the liar paradox. The sorites paradox figures centrally in most discussions of vagueness in philosophy and in logic. In my view, it has profound implications for metaphysics and semantics, as well as for logic. In this paper I will briefly explain why I think so, in a way that draws upon my other writings on vagueness.
1.
Troubles for Standard Two-Valued Logic.
Let "B(n)" abbreviate "a man with n hairs on his head is bald". Here is a familiar quantificational version of a sorites-paradoxical argument: Although the conclusion of this argument is surely false, it is hard to find a satisfying diagnosis of how the argument goes wrong if we confine ourselves to standard two-valued logic. For, since the inference is classically valid, and the second premise is clearly true, the only apparent option is to reject the first premise by asserting its negation:
(1) ~(n)[B(n)  B(n+1)].
But this statement is logically equivalent to (2) (n)[B(n) & ~B(n+1].
And this latter statement, as interpreted within standard two-valued logic, asserts the existence of a determinate one-hair transition point between baldness and non-baldness. Yet it seems essential to the vagueness of "bald" that there be no such transition point. How, then, to diagnose such paradoxical sorites arguments?
One approach, which has the virtue of preserving standard two-valued logic, is epistemicism. 3 On this view, statement (2) is true, and this is because there really is a determinate transition-point between baldness and non-baldness; yet this transition point is unknowable by finite minds like ours. The essence of vagueness, says the epistemicist, is a particular kind of unknowability of determinate conceptual boundaries; vague concepts always have such boundaries, but we can never know where they are. But most philosophers and logicians who have reflected on vagueness, myself included, find epistemicism just impossible to believe.
So for those who reject epistemicism, it appears hard to deny that an adequate diagnosis of the sorites paradox will require some kind of repudiation of standard two-valued logic. What seems needed is a non-standard logic of vagueness which does one or both of these things: (i) provides some way of rejecting the first premise in the above sorites argument without commitment to a sharp transition from baldness to non-baldness; or (ii) renders such sorites arguments invalid. There are various proposed approaches to the logic of vagueness, and there is no consensus about which is best. Among philosophers, and among logicians in philosophy departments, probably the most popular approach is supervaluationism, which I will say more about below. 4 (Among computer scientists and mathematicians who work in logic, probably the most popular view is so-called "fuzzy logic." 5 More on this below too.)
2.
The Metaphysics of Vagueness: Two Approaches.
There are two broad metaphysical approaches to vagueness. One approach affirms socalled ontological vagueness, i.e., vagueness in the mind-independent, discourse-independent, world. More specifically, it affirms the existence of genuine objects and properties that are 3 vague. The other approach denies ontological vagueness, and asserts that vagueness is entirely a matter of language (and of thought-content for instance, the indirect correspondence that constitutes truth is essentially this: under all ways of precisifying the expressions "Mt. Whitney" and "tall" that are consistent (apart from their precision) with the semantic standards governing these terms, the object assigned to "Mt.
Whitney" instantiates the property assigned to "tall".
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Although supervaluationism provides one possible implementation of the notion of indirect correspondence, the core distinction between direct and indirect correspondence can be formulated more generically. I myself, in a number of writings, have proposed construing truth 4 as semantically correct assertibility, under contextually operative semantic standards (and falsity as semantically correct deniability, under such standards.) 8 The semantic standards conspire with goings-on in the mind-independent, discourse-independent, world to yield truth. In the limit case, the applicable standards are referentially strict: they require referential linkages connecting a statement"s basic subsentential constituents to real objects and real properties. In this limit case, truth (i.e., semantically correct assertibility) is direct correspondence. But the contextually operative semantic standards can also work in such a way that the requisite goings-on in the world need not involve entities or properties answering directly to the statement"s basic subsentential constituents. In such cases, truth is indirect correspondence.
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In short, approaches to vagueness that (i) repudiate ontological vagueness, (ii) embrace some alternative to standard two-valued logic, and (iii) treat various non-negative statements employing vague language as true, are effectively construing truth as indirect correspondence.
Moreover, indirect correspondence is naturally understood as semantically correct assertibility, under assertibility standards that are not referentially strict. From this perspective, vague statements are frequently true, under contextually operative semantic standards, but they do not carry genuine ontological commitment to any vague objects or vague properties (under the operative standards)-a good thing, given the denial of ontological vagueness.
Those who posit ontological vagueness, on the other hand, are under no immediate pressure to construe truth as indirect correspondence. Instead, they can regard truth as direct correspondence between vague language (and vague thought-content) on one hand, and vague reality on the other. Typically, believers in ontological vagueness will also espouse some approach to the logic of vagueness that departs from standard two-valued logic; for, there remains an apparent need for such a departure in order to disarm the sorites paradox without commitment to sharp transitions between categories like bald and non-bald. So, for believers in ontological vagueness, reality itself-the instantiation of genuine, vague, properties by genuine, vague, objects-conforms to some kind of non-standard logic.
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One way to implement this approach is to posit ontological vagueness and also embrace some version of so-called "fuzzy logic." Here the key idea is that genuine vague properties can be instantiated not merely in an all-or-nothing way, but also partially, in specific numerical degrees from zero to one. Likewise, genuine vague objects can possess spatial or temporal parts not merely in an all-or-nothing way, but in specific numerical degrees. Language-world correspondence is still direct, on this account, but comes in degrees. Matters of logic, closely connected to the sorites paradox, now enter the discussion in a new and different way, and establish the impossibility of ontological vagueness. Let me explain.
It is widely believed that an essential attribute of vagueness is what Mark Sainsbury 1990
calls boundarylessness, a feature that can be characterized by reference to sorites sequences associated with vague terms. Consider a vague term-say, "heap"-and consider a sorites sequence involving the given term in which the initial statement is true and the final statement is false-say, a series of statements successively predicating the vague term "heap" first to a pile of sand with 1 billion grains, then to an object produced by removing just one grain, then to an object produced by removing yet another single grain, and so forth down to a statement predicating "heap" to a single grain of sand. maintain that vagueness can, and does, possess weak generic logical incoherence without possessing the strong kind-another theme to which I will return shortly.
So weak logical incoherence is a feature of the contextually operative semantic standards governing vague discourse, in ordinary contexts of usage. Insofar as these semantic standards are not referentially strict, and thus only require indirect language-world correspondence, there is no particular problem about this (provided that the semantic standards are not also strongly logically incoherent). However, the world cannot be logically incoherent, even in the weak way: it cannot have features that are the ontological analogues of mutually unsatisfiable semantic standards.
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Hence there cannot be ontological vagueness. Therefore, barring epistemicism, the only viable general approach to vagueness is the one that conceives it non-ontologically, and construes truth as indirect correspondence between vague language and non-vague reality. The sorites paradox is at the heart of the matter in the reasoning that has led up to this conclusion, since the paradox directly reflects the weak generic logical incoherence of vagueness.
Logical Discipline and Weak Logical Incoherence.
How is it that the semantic standards normally governing vague discourse can incorporate 8 weak generic logical incoherence without the strong kind? Briefly, my story goes as follows. 10 of collectivistic-pole semantic requirements over individualistic-pole requirements. But although this refusal to take the forced march is entirely appropriate as a tactic for avoiding commitment to any logically contradictory statements, it would be self-deception to think that such an avoidance tactic somehow eliminates the weak logical incoherence of vagueness. The individualistic-pole requirements are still in force, even though they are dominated by the logically incompatible collectivistic-pole requirements; for, the respective queries in the forced march are all still meaningful and each still demands the same answer as its predecessor, even though it is proper and respectable to duck those individualistic semantic requirements by refusing to take the forced march. The forced march is essentially just the sorites paradox itself, with our noses rubbed in it. 18 What it reveals is the weak generic logical incoherence of vagueness.
6.

Conclusion.
To summarize: Although vagueness is a legitimate and essential feature of human language and thought, it is weakly generically logically incoherent; yet it is not strongly generically logically incoherent, because it exhibits logical discipline involving the dominance, without defeat, of collectivistic semantic standards over individualistic ones. This generic approach to vagueness, which I call transvaluationism, has several important consequences. First, there cannot be ontological vagueness. Second, truth, for vague discourse, is indirect correspondence between vague language and non-vague reality. Third, any adequate account of the logic of vagueness will incorporate the weak generic logical incoherence of boundarylessness;
it will be an implementation of transvaluationism, rather than an alternative to it.
I remarked earlier that indirect correpondence is best understood as semantically correct assertibility, under contextually operative semantic standards that are not referentially strict. I also said that we sometimes employ language under limit-case, referentially strict, directcorrespondence, semantic standards. These are the standards appropriate for serious ontological inquiry. When they are in play, so is classical two-valued logic. Under this limit-case use of language, sorites reasoning can be correctly employed to construct reductio ad absurdum arguments against the existence of vague properties or vague objects-including, of course, not only mountains and clouds, but also tables, chairs, and (regrettably) persons. 19 Fortunately, however, ordinary uses of vague language are not governed by limit-case semantic standards, and normally the contextually operative standards conspire with non-vague reality to render much of our vague discourse true. 6 A mixed view is possible too, asserting that some vagueness is ontological and some is purely semantic; but I will ignore this hybrid position, for simplicity.
7 Supervaluationism preserves standard logic"s theorems and inference rules, but not its bivalent semantics.
A statement applying a vague predicate to a borderline instance will be neither true nor false, since it will come out true under some permissible interpretations and false under others. With respect to the sorites paradox, the supervaluationist affirms both statement (1) and statement (2) above. But under supervaluationist semantics, statement (2) can no longer be understood as asserting a determinate transition-point between baldness and non-baldness. Rather, (2) is true because it comes out true under all permissible interpretations of "bald". values," so to speak-i.e., the need to transcend the impossible goal of finding some logically coherent, semantically correct, collective assignment of semantic status to all the statements in a sorites sequence.
The proper goal for a semantics of vagueness, rather, is to provide an adequate account of the normative standards governing semantically correct assertoric practice. 15 Perhaps transvaluationism can even be implemented by standard two-valued logic, employed in a way that respects in practice the logically disciplined weak generic incoherence of vagueness. Concerning our accommodation of vagueness, Quine 1995 remarks, "What I call my desk could be equated indifferently with countless almost coextensive aggregates of molecules, but I refer to it as a unique one of them, and I do not and cannot care which. Our standard logic takes this...in stride, imposing a tacit fiction of unique though unspecifiable reference" (p. 57). 16 One salient example, discussed in Horgan 1998b section 4, is what I call "iterated supervaluationism."
The core idea of this approach is that the metalanguage for stating supervaluationist semantics is itself vague, and thus it too is subject to a supervaluationist treatment in a meta-meta-language; and so on, all the way up the metalinguistic hierarchy. More specifically, the metalinguistic expression "permissible interpretation" is itself vague, and thus has various permissible interpretations itself in a meta-metalanguage; and so on up. I myself am inclined to prefer a different approach to the logic of vagueness, described in Horgan 1994, sections 2 and 3. 17 The phrase "Zen attitude", suggested by Matjaz Potrc, seems to me to capture well the spirit of my
